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THE EXAGGERATE  SOCIALISM OF RAUL’S CUBA
and the unique role of the services sector 1
                                                                    Abstract
Cuba’s post-revolutionary economic history was penalized by the twin sets of distortions 
stemming from its former, artificial trade relations with the CMEA and from the very nature 
of the state socialist model, let alone the severe costs imposed by the US embargo. 
Conversely, Cuba’s centralized resource allocation system and the consistent priority 
accorded to the satisfaction of basic needs were instrumental in engineering a remarkable 
accumulation of human capital and  an extraordinary development of public services, and 
serendipitously endowed the country with a lingering comparative advantage in some 
advanced, knowledge-based services sectors. However, the tension between Cuba’s 
exceptional human development achievements and the weakness of their material foundation 
cannot be maintained indefinitely. The intrinsic deficiencies of the central planning 
mechanism, the need for expanding the role of the market and of monetary-commercial 
relations, and the inescapability of respecting the law of value and the socialist principle of 
distribution according to work  should be fully acknowledged and translated  in a structural 
reform program. The ultimate goal of such a program should be that of definitely superseding 
the traditional state socialist model, leading to a transition  towards a specifically Cuban form 
of market socialism.
1 The subtitle is inspired by that of a Peruvian novel of the 70s, La vida exagerada de Martín Romaña 
(1981), by the Peruvian writer Alfredo Bryce Echenique (see Bryce Echenique 1981).
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Introduction The  foundations of Cuba’s state socialism model
This goal of paper is to discuss the  past and present problems and 
contradictions of Cuba's  socialist economic  fabric  and   the endogenous policy 
alternatives that might  contribute to their overcoming2.  To this purpose, this 
introductory section briefly identifies a few key  features of Cuba's model of state 
socialism.
Not differently from other revolutionary experiences in the XXth century, 
Cuba’s socialist experiment after the 1959 revolution shared with the previous 
experiences in the USSR and in China the challenge of building a structurally new 
type of economy under conditions of technological backwardness, underdevelopment 
of capitalist production and exchange relations, and  isolation from well-established 
international capitalist markets. Such very hard initial conditions were soon 
aggravated by the sudden exodus of the former ruling class, and with it of most of the 
country’s knowledge endowment, especially in the area of economic organization. 
Moreover, in spite of the fact that the Soviet economy  had already been in 
existence since more than four decades, the understanding of its structural pitfalls 
among socialists and leftists worldwide, and especially in the Third World, was 
hampered by the perception of its ultimate success in contributing to the victory 
against Nazism in WWII, by the intellectual climate of the Cold War, and by the 
specific historical contingency prevailing in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the 
relative performance  of the USSR vis a vis the US and other capitalist powers looked 
quite good. Such circumstances contribute to explain why the revolutionary Cuban 
leadership was not endowed with substantially more advanced theoretical tools in the 
economic domain than their Russian counterparts in 1917 or the Chinese ones in 
1949. 
Conversely, Cuba differed from the former Russian Empire and from China in 
other two key, mutually interrelated  aspects. First, it was a small country. Second, its 
form of underdevelopment was not  stemming mainly from  a dearth of capitalist 
2 Consistently, a relatively minor emphasis is put on the role of exogenous factors. This choice of  an 
essentially endogenous focus, of course, does not imply any underestimation of the devastating impact 
of  the US embargo.
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relations of production and exchange (as it had been the case in pre-revolutionary 
Russia and China) but from the articulation of the bulk of production and exchange 
relations – which were already prevalently capitalist in nature - around the axis of the 
island’s dependency from the US.
Cuba’s economy, in fact, represented one of the most egregious examples of 
“dependencia”- style underdevelopment3, according to the then-fashionable theory 
elaborated by Prebish and the CEPAL school4.  The almost immediate 
implementation of the US embargo after the revolution suddenly turned a  condition 
of dependency into one of dramatic struggle for short-term survival, a goal that could 
not possibly be achieved through a long-term  pursue of relative economic 
independence, self-sustainability, and trade diversification  through a gradual process 
of reforms. 
Such objective and subjective conditions contribute to explain why post-
revolutionary economic policies were characterized by a sort of haphazard approach, 
and the creation of a more or less central planning mechanism took a long time. In the 
1970s and early 1980s a trend towards moderate liberalization, de-centralization, and 
the utilization of material incentives emerged, only to be abruptly reversed in the mid-
1980s5. 
In general terms, three deep structural faults can be identified in Cuba's state 
socialist model. The first was its foundation as a replica of Soviet-style state 
socialism, thereby implying an over-reliance on the potentialities of central planning 
and a denial of the need for maintaining an adequate role for market regulation and 
for monetary and commercial relations  of production and exchange (especially in 
small scale activities) in the domestic market.
The second one was the paternalistic economic relationship established with 
the USSR and the CMEA which led Cuba to further concentrate its already high 
3 The term underdevelopment is to be understood more as hinting to a distorted and hetero-directed 
unfolding of productive forces than to a sheer lack of it whatsoever. By the late 1950s, Cuba was in fact 
relatively advanced with respect to their Latin American and Caribbean countries in terms of income 
per capita, standards of living, and social indicators. 
4 See Prebish, 1949, and CEPAL 1950.1951.
5 See Dominguez 1987, 2005,  Ritter 2004, Mesa-Lago 2005a,b., . Recurrent de-centralizing and re-
centralizing  trends were common in all state-socialist economies . 
3
degree of dependence on  primary commodity exports6, on the basis of a fully 
artificial terms of trade relationship almost totally de-linked from the evolution of 
world prices. The de-linkage of Cuba’s terms of trade from the world structure of 
relative prices, besides deepening the island’s dependence on  exports of sugar and of 
few other raw or  primary commodities and traditional commodity-based products 
(such as ron, cigars, nickel, cobaltum),  contributed to distort the range of 
technological alternatives faced by planners. 
Goods-producing sectors, and agriculture in particular, adopted more capital- 
and energy-intensive techniques than those that would have prevailed under “normal” 
market-based capitalist conditions. Dependency on imports intensified both in the 
primary and the secondary sector. Food self-sufficiency was very low, in spite of 
Cuban lands’ relatively good  natural potential. Previously  existing export-oriented 
services sectors, such as tourism, were almost completely dismantled, while most of 
the human capital and infrastructural resources were earmarked to the direct, non-
market provision of basic services to the population. As a result, problems such as the 
lack of economic diversification and of international competitiveness in nontraditional 
sectors inherited from Cuba’s traditional dependency status were exacerbated. These 
contradictions were going to be paid very dearly after the fall of the USSR.
The third key problem with Cuba’s socialist construction was  the failure to 
grasp the very basic and (at least theoretically) well-established distinction between 
the socialist and the communist principles of production and distribution. This 
idealistic fallacy led to a recurring egalitarian policy bias in favor of state-mandated, 
non-market distribution of goods and services, to a degree that was not consistent with 
the objective level of development of  production forces, while neglecting and 
despising  (material) incentives-based policy tools.
Nevertheless,  for almost three decades, thanks to Soviet support and probably 
also – to an extent that is obviously hard to quantify – to the partial effectiveness of 
the moral incentives based on the socialist humanistic principles, Cuba was able to 
advance towards the progressive realization of its ambitious social development 
agenda. Things started falling apart only in the early 1990s.
6 Pre-revolutionary Cuba, along with sugar and a few other agricultural  commodities, also exported 
services, mainly  tourism and related services. The role of services in Cuba’s export structure would 
recover only in the 1990s.
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 1.   Partial reforms, slow recovery, and crisis
During  the early years after the fall of the USSR and the CMEA the Cuban 
economy all but collapsed. Exports, imports, the GDP, real wages, and consumption, 
all were reduced to a fraction of their former size in a matter of 2-3 years. The 
magnitude of the external shock is made evident by just a few figures. In 1990-1993, : 
Cuba lost 85% of its former export markets, and its terms of trade deteriorated by 
50%. Any access to external financing vanished (see ONE 2004 and Galbraith et al. 
2006).  Exports fell by almost 80%, imports by over 70%. GDP also shrank abruptly 
(- 35% in 1990-1993) and, notwithstanding the subsequent partial recuperation of the 
economy, by 2000 it was still about ¼ lower (in real terms) than in 1990 (ONE 2002). 
Total consumption decreased 25%, gross capital formation 70%.7 Mass starvation was 
only avoided thanks to the lack of class differentiation, the strength of the Cuban state 
and the effectiveness of its selective rationing mechanisms8.  This dramatic phase of 
Cuba's economic history, and especially the most dramatic years of quasi-famine,  are 
often referred to as a "special period in times of peace".
The government reacted to the catastrophic exogenous shock of the early 
1990s with a coping strategy revolving around two key goals: to preserve the basic 
tenets of state socialism and to minimize the social cost paid by the population. 
Growth eventually resumed  in 1994, on the basis of a completely different pattern of 
insertion in the international trade web,  yet one that was not matched by a 
correspondently radical structural change in the social relations of production and 
exchange prevailing in the bulk of Cuba's economy. 
7 According to official ONE statistics, GDP and  consumption  recovered their 1990 level by 2004. 
Conversely,  capital formation remained depressed at less than 40% their 1990 level (See Galbraith et 
al., 2006 and ONE 1996, ONE 2000, ONE 2004). However, the interpretation of  2004 figures is made 
problematic by the puzzles created by the introduction of the new GDP valuation methodology in 2003. 
Actually, it is unlikely that GDP and total consumption ever recovered their peak level reached at the 
end of the 1980s.  In this respect, the fact that the average real  wage in 2008 was still  much lower than 
its 1990 level is telling.
8 The term "Effectiveness" is to be intended  with respect  to the overarching goal of avoiding mass 
starvation, and does not imply that the libreta rationing mechanism was ever efficient, neither in the 
1990s nor presently.
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In the domestic domain, policy-makers launched a significant yet limited 
liberalization and de-centralization drive. The two main macroeconomic objectives 
were to re-orient the structure of Cuba's trade to cope with the new reality of world 
market prices and to rein in the ballooning fiscal deficit (33% in 1993). The latter one 
was pursued mainly cutting the subsidies to SOEs, that in the early 1990s had rose to 
the point of representing over 1/3 of GDP and  ½ of public expenditure (see Galbraith 
2006, ONE 2004). Subsidies to non-essential goods and services were also slashed. 
Notwithstanding its the dramatic scale, this massive subsidies reduction was 
essentially only a form of fiscal retrenchment, and did not seriously modify the 
structure of Cuba's economy.9 
Conversely, the endeavour of completely rearranging - and, to a large extent, 
re-inventing - the export-oriented component of the Cuban economy did amount to a 
major structural change. The main actions launched to achieve such a change were a 
(cautious) open door policy vis a vis foreign capital, the creation of joint-ventures and 
the legalization of the possession of foreign currency. They were preceded by 
constitutional changes that formally eliminated the state monopoly over foreign trade 
and recognized non-state property rights. From the point of view of urban Cuban 
households, the most relevant  de-regulating measures were probably the legalization 
of the individual possession of foreign currency, the  setting up of Currency Exchange 
Houses, and the creation of  a retail trade chain in foreign currency..
Several other de-regulating  and liberalizing measures  were enacted both in 
urban and  rural areas. Yet, they were half-hearted, and domestic consumption 
markets never developed very much. In part, this failure  is to be seen as consequence 
of  the lack of substantial reforms in agriculture and in and rural-urban production and 
exchange relations, that crippled the growth of food supplies and the development of 
food markets ( see  Carriazo 1994, Enriquez 1994, 2003, Garcia Alvarez A., 2006, 
Alvarez 2009,  Arias Guevara 2009, Nova 2006, 2009a,b) .
In sum, the reforms selectively aimed at resuscitating tourism and a few other 
foreign-exchange earning and infrastructural sectors on the pragmatic basis of 
attracting FDI and cooperating with foreign capitalistic firms, while allowing  the 
population to engage in a  limited set of   market and monetary relations, in order to 
9 The reduction of support for SOEs  was not accompanied by a significant   employment  shift to the 
barely-existent non-state sector.
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relieve the State from the impossible burden of ensuring  everybody's survival (see 
Figueres Perez 2004).  Production and exchange relations in the bulk of Cuba's 
economy (public services, sugar, manufacturing, agriculture) changed little. As a 
result, the linkages between the core and  the rest  of the whole edifice of production 
and exchange relations became more tenuous. In turn, this trend  contributed to an 
increasing degree of domestic economic de-integration, and to the surge of  the typical 
schizophrenia  that characterizes the   livelihood strategies of most ordinary Cubans, 
always oscillating between  state and (mostly black) markets, Cuban and convertible 
pesos (formerly US dollars), formality and informality, legality and illegality.
Notwithstanding their purely defensive and circumscribed scope, the limited 
market-oriented reforms10 of the 1990s  allowed Cuba to overcome the most difficult 
moments of the Special Period end to re-embark on a positive growth path. The 
recovery  kept momentum and delivered  increasingly encouraging results until the 
early 2000s, helped by a favourable evolution of  Cuba's terms of trade.11  
Yet, in 2008, the economic situation worsened again. (see Tables 1, 2). The 
deceleration and subsequent crisis of   Cuba's recovery path can partly be attributed to 
unfortunate exogenous shocks (such as the hurricanes and the sharp terms of trade 
deterioration that both hit the island in 2008), but it was mainly caused by economic 
policy mistakes and uncertainties. 
Table 1.    GDP and sectoral growth rates, 2000-2009
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
GDP 5.9 3.2 1.4 3.8 5.8 11.2 12.1 7.3 4.1 1.4
10 On the reforms carried out during the special period, their partially  positive results and the persisting 
structural  problems of the Cuban economy see, among others,  CEPAL 1997, Ritter 2004, Burki and 
Edison 2004, Perez Villanueva , 2006, 2009,  Mesa-Lago 2005a,b, 2008, Hershberg E., 2008, 
Barberia, Dominguez, Perez Villanueva 2005, Triana Cordoví J., 2008, Vidal  P., 2008a,b,  Perez 
Villanueva  2006, 2009, Mesa-Lago  2005 a,b, 2008.
11 To estimate the evolution of Cuba's terms of trade during the special period  and until the mid-2000s 
is not a  straightforward exercise, and depends on the base year utilized. However, it is likely that  an 
initial decline gave way to improvements in the  early 2000s  (see (CEPAL 2009, Mesa-Lago 2008). A 
major positive shift occurred  in 2005 with the beginning of massive exports of professional services  to 
Venezuela and other countries. In the late 2000s, exports of professional services kept rising largely 
offsetting the ever-increasing food import bill, and  Cuba's terms of trade improved further. This 
positive trend reversed rather suddenly in 2008, causing a balance of payments crisis the in turn 
fuelled a banking crisis (see CEPAL, 2009, 2010, Mesa-Lago 2008).
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Agriculture -0.2 -2.3 3.6 -0.2 -12.4 -7.5 19.6 0.6 3.3
Sugar industry -0.3 -11.5 -38.9 12.2 -37.8 -9.9 -3.4 15.8 -1.4
Manufacturing -0.9 1.3 2.6 2.4 4.2 5.3 10.1 4.9 -0.1
Health 2.2 0.7 -2.6 14.8 79.9 12.1 21 12.7 3.4
Table 2     Trade and investment, 2000-2009
% of GDP 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Imports 16.9 16.1 18.2 19.6 18.1 18.6 15.1
Exports 14.1 18.3 24.3 22 23.3 25 25.7
Investment 12.5 10.6 12.7 14.3 13.6 15.9 12
Growth rates
Imports 13 25.8 20.4 -1.1 7.4 -17.7
Exports 19 47.5 1.3 13.8 11.6 4.1
  Goods -1.7 8.1 -2.9 12.2 2.6
  Services 77.8 -1 20 11.4 4.6
In 2003, emboldened by the partly satisfactory results obtained until that 
moment  and by the  new, more favourable  economic and financial conditions created 
by a vastly changed regional and global geopolitical scenario, Cuban policy-makers 
embarked once again in an excessively ideology-driven recentralizing policy turn. 
The results, as usual, were disappointing: traditional distortions and inefficiencies 
were exacerbated, the impact on  economic growth was negative, and progressively 
mounting real and financial disequilibria created the pre-conditions that would lead to 
crisis in the late 2000s. 
Yet - both in Cuba and  abroad - the perception of  this policy failure was 
obfuscated by the one-time boost stemming from the boom in professional services 
exports and by the confusion created by the new GDP evaluation methodology, that 
was introduced almost contemporarily to the launching of the new policy course. A 
new  financial crisis has been  again unfolding again since 2008, , and one of its prime 
victims has been  the newborn financial system itself and its international credibility. 
This crisis is largely the product of the shortcomings of the 2004 monetary reform - 
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which left a legacy of monetary duality and currency  overvaluation - and of other 
subsequent mistakes in the  domains of monetary, exchange rate, and trade  policies.12 
During the first years, actually, the key objective of monetary stability 
was basically achieved, as the convertible pesos (CUCs)   segment of monetary 
circulation was backed by sufficient  foreign exchange reserves. This equilibrium, 
however, began to unravel in  2008. Due essentially to a lack of flexibility  in import 
and investment planning, the government  failed  to react promptly to an unforeseen 
deterioration of the terms of trade, which was in turn partly caused by the 
12 The  2004 monetary reform  led to the so-called  " de-dollarization" of Cuba's economy and 
to the creation of  a new currency, the convertible peso (CUC in Spanish), which parity with the US 
dollar was initially set a an official exchange rate of 1-1. The reform   can be criticized with respect to 
four mutually interrelated issues. 
First, in a relatively favorable macroeconomic and international situation like that prevailing 
in the mid-2000s, the chance was lost to proceed more boldly towards a reasonable unified exchange 
rate for the Cuban peso (CUP in Spanish),  avoiding monetary duality. 
Second, ordinary state enterprises were not allowed to purchase CUCs with their CUPs in 
order to finance their imports. This prohibition confirmed the preference for an over-centralized 
planning approach, severely undermined  enterprise autonomy  and artificially created two almost 
completely separated monetary sectors, the "enterprise sector" and the "  population sector", thereby 
further contributing to the segmentation and de-integration of Cuba's economy. 
Third, the  CUP/US dollar exchange rate parity was maintained at the outlandish rate of 1-1 
for planning and inter-enterprises accounting and transaction   purposes, just while an official exchange 
rate of 24-1 was set in the newly-established Cuban pesos/CUC monetary market. The main result was 
to deepen the chasm between enterprise accounts and the external reality, thus making it still more 
difficult to  enterprise managers and workers to adopt  economically virtuous behaviors (see  Piñeiro 
Harnecker 2010).  
Fourth, possibly due also to dubious non-economic prestige considerations, the CUC 
exchange rate was subsequently re-valued in 2005 by 8% when the  balance of payments was in 
surplus, and kept fixed afterwards, when the external accounts deteriorated. 
The result was a substantial currency overvaluation that  doubly jeopardized the country's 
economic performance. On one hand, as it would have happened as well in any other country, the 
currency overvaluation  implied an  anti-tradables bias and damaged Cuba's s international 
competitiveness. On the other hand, as the bulk of foreign exchange was administratively allocated to 
enterprises by the state,  the   overvaluation  increased the leverage of the  central planning mechanism, 
thereby further weakening  the relative autonomy of enterprises and the role of prices in overall 
resources allocation (See Vidal 2008a, 2009, 2010a, Canler 2008, Orro 2008, Morales Pita 2008)
Thus, " the fixed  exchange rate policy did not contribute to the balance of payments and 
foreign exchange market objectives, and added to other previous decisions to provoke a crisis in Cuban 
banks"( Vidal  2010b, p.16).   Among them, the most negative one was the 2004-2005 re-centralization 
of enterprises foreign exchange receipts in  the hands of the state, probably the most egregious example 
of the counter-reformist  policy stance  launched in 2003.  Under the new system (which was in fact a 
re-edition of the old one that had preceded the 1990s reforms) once again the enterprises lost their 
partial autonomy, and could only have access to foreign exchange reserves via a rigid  and very 
centralized mechanism , obtaining their quota of  funds only upon  approval of  a special body, the 
foreign exchange allocation committee (CAD in Spanish).   
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repercussions of the world capitalist crisis (Vidal 2010b).  The monetary counterpart 
of this policy mistake was an excess of emission  of  convertible pesos, which 
inevitably eroded the major quality of the young currency : convertibility itself.13 
Already by mid-2008s  Cuba was forced to default on various external debt 
obligations with creditors from Japan, Germany,  Canada, and France. This trend 
became progressively more generalized, and the amount of non-payments  might 
have reached up to 1 bn US$ by year-end (CEPAL 2009). Most foreign investors’ 
bank accounts were frozen and a full-fledged banking crisis erupted in early 2009.  As 
a result “ the Cuban banks are trapped in a systemic liquidity crisis, which could not 
be completely overcome so far” ( Vidal 2010a, p.1).
Moreover, the centralized foreign a exchange allocation system increasingly 
penalizes the ability of most firms to  perform their basic functions. The foreign 
exchange approval committee (CAD)  has been eliminated  and its functions reverted 
to the ministries, but little has changed in  terms of enterprise autonomy.  The present 
two-tier foreign exchange allocation process is  still vertical and centralized.  The 
central planning machine, through the Cuenta Unica  de Ingresos en Divisas del 
Estado (only/unified  foreign  exchange state account), allocates the funds to the 
various ministries, who in turn distribute them to their subordinate enterprises (see 
Vidal 2010a,b and  Piñeiro Harnecker 2010). 
Yet, this is not the end of the story. As the foreign exchange is fact rationed, 
firms need liquidity certificates (Certificados de Liquidez (CLs) in Spanish) to 
convert CUCs into foreign exchange.  CLs are  issued in limited  quantities by the 
ministries, on a ad hoc, discretional basis.  In practice, thus, not all convertible pesos 
are  convertible.  The Cuban economy is thus left in the unenviable and probably 
unique situation of  functioning on the basis of two different national currencies, 
neither of which is fully convertible. Besides CUCs accounts, many foreign 
exchange-denominated accounts belonging to foreign and joint venture enterprises 
were also frozen in a  desperate attempt to control the financial crisis, and have only 
partially be reactivated since 2009 (Gazon 2010, EIU 2010). 
13 Econometric evidence shows that, in the very peculiar and segmented  context of Cuba's centrally 
planned economy, external shocks do not affect inflation or the exchange rate in the short term, but 
tend mainly to increase  pressures and disequilibria in the exchange rate market where CUCs are traded 
for other currencies (see Vidal 2008b).
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The crippling implications  of such a monetary and banking mess are self-
evident. Besides exacerbating the  already widespread distortions stemming from  the 
double currency regime14, it negatively affects the country’s present and perspective 
access to foreign financing sources, the  flows of foreign direct investment, the 
functioning of  domestic credit operations,   and the provision of capital,  intermediate 
and final goods to both enterprises and households. Therefore, the foreign exchange 
constraint  has become even more binding.15
Economic growth has decelerated  markedly  with respect to the promising 
results achieved in the 2004-2007 favourable  cycle. The GDP   growth rate was 4.1% 
in 2008 and 1.4% in 2009. These moderately positive figures, however, were pushed 
up by the resilience of many services sectors and by a  modest pick up in agricultural 
production16 , and partly mask a harsher reality. In 2009 the government was forced to 
cut drastically both imports and investment.  For the first time in the decade, 
manufacturing production decreased (see Tables 1, 2)17. 
In this difficult predicament, the government (always distracted and 
constrained by the urgency of micro-managing the crisis in the short term) has had the 
merit of halting the previous re-centralizing policy bias and of starting moving in the 
opposite direction. Yet, there has been  so far  until recently a hiatus between the 
boldness of  the public acknowledgment of the dramatic and structural inadequacy of 
many key components of the state socialism model, on one hand,  and the shyness and 
excessive cautiousness in the area of concrete policy measures, on the other hand (see 
Pérez Villanueva 2009, 2010). The major reform initiatives so far have been the pro-
peasant agrarian reform and the liberalization of petty, small scale activities (most of 
them  in the   sector of commercial services). Both have the potential to generate large 
14 Most SOEs (i.e., the vast majority of  Cuban firms, excluding joint ventures) operate both in  Cuban 
pesos and in CUCs.  The official CUC exchange rate with respect to the dollar and the other major 
international currencies  has been overvalued  during most of its  short existence, and its  degree of 
“real” overvaluation can only have  increased since the inception of the banking crisis. However, the 
existence of two domestic currencies with two reciprocal  parity rates provokes far worse distortions 
than the overvaluation of the CUC.  Some inter-firm transactions take place on the basis of  a given 
exchange rate between the two Cuban currencies, and some  at another rate, which differs from the first 
by a factor of 24.  Even under rigid central planning conditions, where the role of price signals is 
minimized, the virtual impossibility of carrying out basic economic calculations and the consequent 
distortionary impact on the  behaviour of firms, managers and workers cannot be underestimated.
15 As Cuba cannot borrow  from IFIs or from most international banks, the binding linkage between 
foreign exchange earnings and growth is particularly strong  (see Vidal and Fundora, 2008).
16 The   minor improvement of  agricultural production in 2009 might be an encouraging sign that  the 
limited reforms  in the rural sector are beginning to bear fruit.
17 The sugar and mining industries also recorded negative growth in 2009.
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economic benefits, and are very relevant  from an ideological, theoretical and political 
viewpoint, as they  run counter the basic tenets of traditional state socialism. Yet, their 
impact so far has been marginal. In the case of the agrarian reform and the other pro-
peasantization agricultural policy initiatives, the main reasons for the scarcity of 
productive results are the dearth of of financial resources to support  the  peasant 
farms and  the reluctance to  radically restructure the state farms, the cooperatives, 
and the centralized  system of inputs and outputs commercialization. Moreover, more 
time is needed for the new production and exchange relations to establish themselves 
in the Cuban countryside. The (mostly urban) liberalization of self employment and 
petty private  activities has been purely experimental and  extremely circumscribed so 
far, but the government appears  now favourable to deepen and widen its scope. 
In this respect, , contradicting most observers' expectations, a major policy 
decision appears to have been taken in the summer of 2010.  On September 14 the 
government declared that in a few months up to half a million state employees (about 
10% of the country's workforce) would be laid off,  and invited to fence for 
themselves18 in the newly-encouraged small scale commercial sector (see Morrissey 
2010, Wilkinson 2010). 178 types of activities will be authorized (more than in the 
1990s), and the overall regulatory framework  will be  made more flexible, including 
with respect to the sensitive issue of  hiring non-relatives
It has been observed that these measures are still too limited and timid, as - 
besides other limitations - the  list of authorized activities is too narrow and 
excessively detailed, and does not cover knowledge-intensive activities (Vidal  and 
Pérez Villanueva 2010).  Nevertheless, this dramatic policy move  probably heralds 
the beginning of a new and far more radical round of  economic reforms.
2. Tertiarization 
18 The Cuban government has stated its political willingness to avoid simply throwing redundant 
workers out on to the street, and stressed that nobody will be left without some form of social 
protection.  Yet, the State cannot afford to be very generous. It is envisaged that the workers who lose 
their jobs will be granted an allowance  corresponding to between one and five monthly wages, and 
those with 25 or more   years of service will be offered an option of early retirement (Sánchez Serra 
2010). 
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The crisis and the reforms of the special period have led to a pronounced 
tertiarization19 and de-industrialization process.  The relative weight of services GDP 
and employment in Cuba is exceptionally high, and that of industry is particularly 
low, in comparison to other Latin American countries. The contrast with the  two 
Asian market socialist countries  is even starker (see Table 3). 
During the 2000s decade,  major changes also occurred in the  relative weight of 
different sectors  inside the services  macro-sector (SMS) 20. In this respect, it is useful to 
distinguish between two  services sub-macro-sectors, on the basis of the strength of their 
respective linkages to the goods macro-sector (GMS). The first one is constituted by 
infrastructural and other goods production supporting services (IGPSSs), and the other by 
directly needs-oriented services (DNSs). 







2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005
Cuba 19.4 14.6 73.8 79.9 62 67
Argentina 28 36 67 55 76 75
Brazil 28 29 67 65 59 58
Colombia 30 34 60 56 60 56
19 By the beginning of the 1990s, Cuba's economy was already dominated  by services, which 
contributed more than 70% to GDP.   The term tertiarization   (tercearización in Spanish)  refers to the 
increase in the relative weight of the services sectors taking place in most contemporary developed and 
developing economies. Among the latter, this process is particularly pronounced in the Latin American 
and Caribbean region. See, for instance, Bonet ( 2007) on tertiarization in Colombia.
20 I refer to services as a whole as a macro-sector (SMS). The other macro-sector (GMS) covers good-
producing activities.
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*Latin America and 
Caribbean 30 34 65 60 65 60
China 46 48 39 40 13 na
Vietnam 41 37 39 38 39 38
 
VAI                     Value Added in Industry
VASERV            Value Added in Services
GDP                    Gross Domestic Product
ESERV                Employment in Services
ETOT                  Employment, Total
Sources:  WDI 2010, ONE 2010
Note. Data for Cuba are from Tables 3 and 4, calculated on the basis of ONE  2010, 2006. Data for 
other countries are from WB 2010. Yet, the two sources are broadly comparable, taking into account 
that the methodology used to compile in tables 3 and 4 is based on a relatively broader definition of 
services macro-sector than that used by WB 2010. Most data on Cuba during the  2000s decade are not 
available in WB 2010, with the exception of those on the employment structure. WB 2010 reports a 
percentage share of services in total employment of 54 and 61 in 2000 and 2005 respectively. Both 
figures are lower than those reported in the table, yet they confirm a strong increasing trend.
Most21 IGPSSs, on one hand, rely for their functioning on the availability of a 
consistent amount of dedicated physical capital. On the other hand, they are not 
directly aimed at the  satisfaction of  human needs, as they are rather ancillary to the 
production and transportation of goods. Thus, their output can be seen  an 
intermediate product entering an enlarged macro-production function of goods. Given 
the strength of their  reciprocal  backward and forward linkages, the  performance of 
this group of services tends to go hand in hand with that of the GMS.
21 The validity and applicability of this aggregation criterion is limited by the availability of data. The 
strength of  forward  and backward linkages with the production of goods varies from one services 
sector to another. To some extent, for instance, services such as transport and communications  cater 
directly to household's needs.  Physical capital intensity also varies across this sub-group of services.
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DNSs  are labor intensive and, in many cases, skills and HK-intensive as well. 
This is especially true for education, health, and S&T, but also the tourist sector has 
increasingly being attracting some of the brightest and most entrepreneurial young 
professionals and skilled workers. Conversely, DNSs are not very physical capital-
intensive.  The latter observation particularly applies (so far) to professional services 
such as health and  education, where  knowledge and direct human contact 
traditionally constitute the essential conditions for service provision, with 
comparatively little need for any material support.22 Therefore, the sub-macro-sector 
of services directly aimed at satisfying basic (health, education, social assistance and 
security ) and non-basic (such as hotels, restaurant, and other tourism-related 
activities) needs is the most de-linked from the sphere of material goods production. 
By the year 2000, the IGPSSs sub-macro-sector was the largest, as it 
contributed 43.5% of  the total GDP and almost 60% of the services GDP. The other 
services sub-macro-sector, DNS, was correspondently smaller (about 30% of total 
GDP and 40% of the services GDP).
During the decade, two major changes unfolded in the structure of Cuba's 
GDP, showing  a worrying trade towards a progressive disarticulation and 
segmentation of the country's economy. The first trend is the  continuation of the 
increase in the relative weight of  services in GDP, that reaches  further in the early 
2000s,  reaching almost 80% in 2005, and oscillates around this high level until the 
rest of the decade. Correspondently, the share of goods keeps shrinking until 2005, 
and stabilizes  therefore at  around 19%  (see Table  4). 
The second trend reflects the  internal evolution of the services macro-sector. 
IGPSSs are pulled down by the dismal performance of goods production. Their 
contribution to GDP declines by over four percentage points between 2000 and 2005, 
(from 43.5% to 39.3%), recovers ephemerally in 2006, and falls again afterwards, 
reaching a low of 38.4 % in 2009.  Consistently, IGPSS's relative weight as a 
component of the services sector as a whole falls by ten points between 2000 and 
2005, and appears to stabilize at just below 50% by the end of the decade.    
22 This line of reasoning cannot be pushed too far, especially in the XXI century. In the old times, 
knowledge  was mostly transmitted orally from an individual teacher to on or few pupils, and doctors 
tried to save patients mostly  prescribing health-enhancing behavioural changes  or feeding them 
home-made herb potions. Modern health and education services are increasingly dependent on  access 
to goods such as drugs, medical equipment, books, journals, and computers. 
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Conversely, by 2005, DNSs increase both their GDP share (to over 40%) and 
their share in total services (to just over 50%), and subsequently maintain these gains. 
However, not all DNS follow the same trend.  Hotels and restaurants, S&T, and Other 
personal, community, and association activities experience a slight decline in their 
respective GDP contributions. The shares corresponding to public administration, 
defence, social security, and education increase moderately. What really pushes up 
DNS as whole is the more than doubling of the GDP share of culture and sports (from 
2% in 2000 to 4.3% in 2009) and the spectacular rise of the share of  health and 
social assistance (from 7.7% in 2000, to 15.1% in 2005, to 15.8% in 2009).
Actually, the bulk of  Cuba’s services macro-sector  is constituted by social 
and other public sectors. Among them, the size of  the education and health sectors in 
particular has traditionally been very high by international standards. However, their 
respective behaviors in the 2000s differ markedly. The weight of education in GDP 
remains basically stable, oscillating around 9-10% of GDP, while that of health23 
increases even further. In fact, the estimated contribution of health to Cuba’s total 
GDP increases  from 8.4% in 2001 to  10.1% in 2003 (mainly as a result of the new 
evaluation methodology), and  keeps growing even more  afterwards, reaching  about 
16% in 2008-2009 (see Table 3).  Such a relative weight of health in the national 
economy is extremely high24 and appears to be matched only by one country in the 
world, the US.25 
Conversely, the GDP contribution of agriculture, which was already very low 
at the beginning of the decade, declines even further. The already moribund sugar 
industry also kept faring very badly26, and  its already marginal relative  GDP 
23 “Health and social assistance”, according to the ONE terminology.
24 The number of doctors and stomachologists  in Cuba kept increasing since the early 1970s. By the 
year 2000 there were almost 66000 doctors and 1000 stomachologists. As result, Cuba had  ratios of 
169 habitants/doctor and 1124 habitants/ stomachologist.  The number of doctors and stomachologists 
kept increasing during the 2000s, reaching over 74000 and 11000 respectively, and the theoretical 
corresponding ratios with respect to the population  fell  to 150 and 971 respectively. These figures are 
very high by international standards. Yet, it has to be taken into account that a large share  of this huge 
contingent is now working abroad, meaning that the real availability of  highly qualified medical 
professionals attending the needs of Cuba's population has been significantly reduced (Source: ONE 
2010).
25 See WHO 2010.   
26 Recent zafras were about 15% of those of the early 1990s, and the 2010 zafra appears to have been 
the worst since the revolution..
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contribution  halved -  just in  a period when world prices were high and the 
profitability of the sugar industry in other developing countries  (such as Brazil) was 
very satisfactory. The relative - and, in some cases, absolute - decline of other parts of 
the Cuban economy during the 2000s was more evenly spread, as the contribution to 
GDP of most other  goods and services sectors decreased slightly. The  contribution to 
GDP of the (non-sugar) manufacturing sector fell by two percentage points (from 
15.4% to 13.4%) in 2000-2005 and recovering slightly afterwards. Most industries 
declined or stagnated, the exceptions being  the export-oriented sub-sectors where 
Cuba traditionally has a  comparative advantage (nickel, rhum, cigars) and a few 
others  that benefited from inward FDI flows. The GDP  contribution  of  IGPSSs as a 


















GDP 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Agriculture and Fishing 6.6 5.7 4.4 3.4 3.9 3.8 3.9
Mining 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Sugar industry 2.2 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4
Manufacturing (Non-Sugar) 15.4 14.2 13.4 13.1 14.2 14.3 14.5
   Goods macro-sector (GMS) 25 21.6 19 17.5 19 19.1 19.4
Construction 5.8 5.3 5.6 6.3 5.5 5.4 5.4
Electricity, Gas, Water 2 1.5 1.3 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.6
Transport, Storing, Communications 9.6 9 8.8 7.8 7.8 8.1 8.3
Trade, maintenance, repairs 19.5 19.2 18.5 23.2 21.5 19.4 18.6
Financial services 2.8 2.2 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9
Entrepreneurial and real estate services 3.8 3.5 3 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6
   Infrastructural and other goods production 
supporting services (IGPSSs) 43.5 40.7 39.3 43.7 41.3 39.2 38.4
% of total services 0.59 0.52 0.49 0.54 0.52 0.49 0.48
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Hotels and restaurants 5.2 5.5 5.1 4.2 4 4.3 4.5
Public administration, defence, social security 2.9 3.4 3.3 3.6 3 3.1 3.4
Science and technological innovation 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4
Education 8.5 10.3 10 8.9 8.5 9.3 9.6
Health, social assistance 7.7 10.1 15.1 14.5 15.7 16.3 15.8
Culture and sports 2 3.4 3.2 3.5 3.9 3.9 4.3
Other personal, community, and association 
activities 3.5 3.7 3.4 2.6 3 2.9 3
   Directly needs-oriented services (DNSs) 30.3 36.9 40.6 37.8 38.4 40.2 41
% of total services 0.41 0.48 0.51 0.46 0.48 0.51 0.52
   Services macro-sector (SMS) 73.8 77.6 79.9 81.5 79.7 79.4 79.4
Import tariffs* 1.3 1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.5 1
Source: ONE 2010
* The interpretation of "import rights", the last item included in the GDP structure by ONE, is 
puzzling. Apparently, it is  considered a source of value  added just as goods- producing and services 
sectors (the totals do not even approximately add up at 100 otherwise), but why should it be so is 
unclear.
3. The goods-services dichotomy
Along with tourism, the goods-producing sectors are those that, even in an 
indirect fashion, are the most integrated with the world economy. Thereby, owing to 
Cuba’s small size of Cuba and to its pronounced import dependency, and 
notwithstanding the ubiquitous distortions  in the domestic  arena,  their process of 
value creation cannot  ultimately be divorced form the structure of relative prices 
prevailing in international markets.27 Conversely, the price structure along the whole 
value chain leading to the supply of services different from tourism is mainly 
27 Both goods-producing and services  in Cuba were in fact  amply divorced from the price structure 
and trends prevailing in the capitalist world during the time when it was integrated in the CMEA and 
received large Soviet subsidies. Basically, this is not an option any longer for the goods-producing 
macro-sector, but  it is still  true  in  part for the services macro-sector.  
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determined by non-market factors, such as the discretionary power of Cuban planning 
authorities28 and the largely – albeit not exclusively – extra-economic motivations 
which shape the bilateral intergovernmental agreements with Venezuela and the other 
countries  who buy the bulk of  Cuba’s professional services exports.29  As a result, 
one of the dimensions of the lack of  intersectoral integration of Cuba’s economy is a 
degree of segmentation between the GMS and the SMS, and thus of their respective 
price structures,  that is higher than in most other countries. This peculiarity might 
help to explain why, in practice, the two macro-sectors tend to exhibit scarcely 
correlated performance trends.
In sum, taking also into account the already-mentioned statistical uncertainties 
linked to the change in GDP measurement methodology which took place in 2004, it 
is likely that since the mid-2000s the static and dynamic  estimates of value creation 
in the two macro-sectors of Cuba’s economy have been  diverging, with figures 
relative to goods-producing activities being more easily amenable to international 
comparisons than  those relating to services. 
Another peculiar consequence of the divergences in the mechanisms of price 
formation in the two macro-sectors is that Cuba’s external trade balance is now 
primarily dependent on  activities  (medical and other professional services) which are 
among the least integrated with the rest of the economy, along the dimensions of  the 
value chain and other inter-sectoral linkages. Yet, in practice, these services activities 
show ex post, a significant degree of international competitiveness. This apparent 
paradox  is in fact a necessary consequence of the skewed and poorly integrated 
structure of Cuba's economy as a whole. As the goods-producing, internally integrated 
macro-sector is in shambles due to lack of investment and the systematic disrespect of 
the law of value30, it cannot possibly be internationally competitive. On the contrary, 
scarce resources have been allocated for decades on a non-market basis to prioritized 
social services that are blessed by a relative isolation from the rest of the economy, as 
they are  intensive in human capital but not in physical capital, and are not very 
28 The new macroeconomic  protagonism of professional services is taking place in the framework of 
an ad hoc price structure set up originally mainly for social, rather than economic goals.
29 Cuba also exports medical services  and medical tourism services  to mostly  Western  and Latin 
American customers on a basically  “normal” market basis, and is very active in promoting  this kind of 
activity. The role of  intra-sectoral and inter-sectoral cross-subsidization in  the formation of the export 
price of  these  health services exports is difficult to gauge, but their very existence  is a clear sign of 
effective international competitiveness. 
30 See below, note 53.
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dependent on the supply of inputs from the goods-producing macro-sector. The most 
potentially tradable components of these intrinsically social services ( health and 
other professional services) eventually achieved international competitiveness.  
As it is presently structured, the stellar professional services export 
performance  since the mid-2000s has powerfully  contributed to  release almost 
overnight the crucial external constraint31 which structurally limits Cuba’s economic 
development. Professional services exports allowed Cuba to grow  handsomely in 
spite of the negative contribution of  many aspects of domestic economic policies, at 
least until the unfolding of the largely home-made32banking crisis, which  led to the 
present economic downturn. Still now, professional services exports  are the strongest 
positive factor that prevents the economy form nose-diving in an otherwise grim 
picture..
Yet, the exceptional prominence acquired by professional services  in the 
structure of Cuba’s trade also implies a distortion – even if one that might include 
good potential for  a further, more integrated development of the services macro-
sector, and especially of its export-oriented  component.
As a pivotal export sector, professional services has two main drawbacks. 
First, so far it has worked  basically on the basis of  shifting towards exports a 
sizeable part of the supply potential created by huge  past and present human capital 
investments, a part which would have been  underutilized otherwise.33 But doctors as 
are not  micro-conductors, cellular phones or Ipods (as opposed, as will be argued 
31 This constraint is partly exogenous, a product due to the US embargo and to a number of 
unfavorable characteristics of the world economy that are biased against small underdeveloped 
countries, and especially  so in the case of small island countries. Yet, the external constraint can be 
seen also as partly endogenous, as  there is  in Cuba a fair potential for export promotion and import 
substitution  that might be exploited by more suitable economic policies.
32 Due to Cuba’s isolation from the money and credit flows and from he very institutions who 
dominate  world financial capital, the modalities and peculiarities of Cuba’s banking and financial 
crisis  were substantially de-linked from those of the global capitalist financial crisis. The same cannot 
be said for the broader, real  economic consequences of the financial meltdown. The so-called “food 
crisis” that led food prices skyrocket and inflated Cuba’s food import bill was a relatively independent 
phenomenon rooted in long-term  changes occurring in food-producing and energy industries. It was 
only mildly related to the world financial crisis (mainly  via the price hikes and volatility increases 
caused by an enhanced role of financial speculation in food markets). The fall in the price of nickel and 
the less-than-expected performance  of Cuba's tourism  were surely   due to the overall retrenchment of 
effective demand, originating mainly from OECD countries.  
 
33 Of course, such a process could only proceed at quasi-zero cost to a point, and Cuba has already 
gone very far in a very short time People routinely complain that as too many of the best doctors have 
gone  abroad, the functioning of the public health system  in Cuba itself  (  due also to the  lack of drugs 
and medical equipment, now aggravated by the  crisis) has markedly worsened. 
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below, to medical and professional services  seen as in a more comprehensive, holistic 
way). They require  many years of highly specialized training, and productivity in the 
“doctor’s production function” can hardly improve.34 This is a clear, specific example 
of a general economic principle, stating that material productivity can improve 
markedly in the domains where humankind applies its  ever-increasing knowledge to 
manipulate and transform nature, thereby creating more and more goods of improving 
quality.35 In the area of specialized human capital formation such rapid productivity 
gains cannot be achieved (at least in terms of numbers of doctors or other specialists 
trained), due to the very nature of learning and to the heavy dependence of teaching 
from reciprocal human interaction, which is itself  very human capital-intensive (see 
Triana Cordoví  2008a,b,  2010).
The second drawback stems from the paucity of professional services' 
forward  and backward linkages, which weaken their multiplier and spillover effects 
on the rest of the Cuban economy (see Gabriele 2010). 
In sum, the jump in Cuba’s professional services exports, unless it is 
accompanied by a series of complementary “industrial” policies aimed at further 
transforming, enriching and diversify this and other services sectors, is a once-and 
for-all occurrence. It is not intrinsically unsustainable per se, but it cannot constitute 
an adequate basis for further development, because essentially it has already reached 
the upper limits of its potential. In theoretical terms, it constitutes a unique jump of 
Cuba’s production frontier than cannot be simply replicated.
4. Falling wages, deteriorating distribution, and improving human 
development: is the Cuban paradox sustainable? 
34 It can rather improve indirectly, as far as better and more updated medical education and training can 
produce more modern and informed doctors who are better equipped to heal patients. Anyway, the 
reform of universities and other third grade education centres is a long and complex process. 
35 Of  course, this kind of man/nature interaction is far from idyllic, and sooner or later  it is inevitably 
constrained by the entropic  principle and by the physical limits imposed by the planetary environment
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The state socialist system has allowed Cuba to advance impressively  in  terms of 
social and human development, particularly from the view point of the universal 
satisfaction of  basic needs.  Even according to this relatively narrow but crucial 
measure of well-being and social justice, as there is a small group of developing 
countries, some of them in Latin America, that are better off than Cuba. Yet, Cuba's 
experience is truly unique and amazing precisely because it achieved so much in this 
domain notwithstanding its poor economic development record. 36 
During the special period,, real wages first collapsed and then  recovered only 
a fraction of their previous purchasing power37, and  personal income distribution 
seriously deteriorated (see Espina Prieto 2006)38. Yet, the government managed to 
maintain and even increase its support to basic social services, and Cuba's human 
development indicators kept improving, in spite of the impoverishment of most of the 
population.39 
Table 5 shows  a few basic human development and economic indicators for 
Cuba and a few other countries. According to the most recent UNDP estimates, 
Cuba's Human Development Index (HDI) in 2007 was 0.863, much higher than the 
regional average. . Yet, it was still lower (in absolute terms) than that of 1990 (0.877) 
(Alonso 2009).Cuba's ranking with respect to this well-known (albeit not universally 
appreciated and arbitrarily aggregated) indicator was 51 out of 182 countries.40
 Thus, Cuba's present human development level is good in a comparative 
perspective, but not as outstanding as it was two decades ago, when it was almost 
36 Cuba's social outcomes, even if achieved under a non-liberal regime, can be seen as basically 
consistent with Rawls' second principle of justice. See Rawls 1971.
37 According to a recent and reliable estimate, the average real wage, in particular, fell from 188 to 19 
pesos in the 1989-1993 and slowly recovered thereafter, reaching a level of 45 pesos by 2008 (see 
Vidal Alejandro 2009, Ritter 2010a,b). Thus, even by the late 2000s the purchasing power of wages 
was only about ¼  its pre-crisis level.
38 According to (obviously questionable) available estimates, Cuba's  Gini index  would presently be of 
the order of  0.40, low by Latin American standards  but not so much by  more general international 
standards.  Estimated  income inequality  appears to be moderately higher in China, but lower in 
Vietnam (see UNDP 2008, 2009)
39 As Cuba's socioeconomic system  combines a high level of human development with a low level of 
environmental impact, it can theoretically be seen as  a champion of  ecologically sustainable 
development (see Halle Loh., and Goldfinger (eds.), 2006, Fiala 2008). 
40 Cuba's ranking peaked at 39 in 1990, deteriorated during the Special Period, bottoming at 89 in 
1994, and progressively recovered afterwards. 
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universally hailed as an at least partially positive example even by otherwise 
unsympathetic critics (see Mesa-Lago 2000, 2003). Three countries in Latin America 
do better  (Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile), although  Costa Rica does slightly worse, 
and two semi-industrialized, resource-rich  giants such as Mexico or Brazil do much 
worse41. Yet, all these countries have a level of economic development (roughly 
represented by the GDP per capita in PPP terms indicator) between 40% and 100% 
higher than that of Cuba. The ranking of Colombia - a Latin American country  with a 
per capita GDP comparable to that of Cuba -  is 82, more than 30  points lower.42 The 
level of human development in Cuba is also still much higher than in both  Asian fast-
growing market socialist countries. The differences in terms of HDI ranking are huge, 
in spite of the fact that China's per capita GDP is now approaching that of Cuba and 
that Vietnam's  measured income inequality is  lower than that of Cuba43 (see Table 
5).
The uniqueness of Cuba's schizophrenic development experience is well 
represented by the last indicator in Table 5, the rank differential between human and 
economic development respectively.  If positive, this indicator shows that a country is 
faring better in terms of  human  development  than in terms of economic 
development than the world average, and vice versa.44 Cuba's rank differential is 44, 
the highest in the whole sample of 182 developed and developing countries. The best 
performing (in terms of human development) Latin American countries also have 
high positive rank differentials, but they are all less than half that of Cuba45. 
Such an acute contradiction between human and economic development 
cannot be sustained forever. Notwithstanding their  multiple synergies and 
complementarities46, beyond a certain point a trade off occurs if human and economic 
41 Brazil’s  marked inferiority with respect to Cuba in the realm of human development is particularly 
remarkable, taking into account that the South American country  has  experienced many years of 
strong growth and moderately progressive social policies.
42 There is  another  social domain where Cuba outperforms most other Latin American   countries, 
although it is a very controversial one.  Cuban women have free and rather easy and safe access not 
only to  family planning devices, but also to abortion. The diffusion of abortion, besides helping to 
contain population growth, also contributes to Cuba's  extraordinarily low level of infant mortality and 
to reduce the prevalence of births with severe physical and mental defects.  This point is acknowledged 
by  Mesa Lago (2008), who nevertheless appears to criticize what he sees as an excessive recourse to 
abortion on the part of Cuba's public health services.
43 See above, note 41.
44 Most resource-rich  African and Asian countries exhibit  a negative ranking differential.  
45 The rank differential in China and Vietnam is also positive, yet it is just about  1/4  of Cuba's one. 
The rank differential  for Mexico, Brazil and Colombia is barely positive.
23
development   respective trends keep going towards opposite directions. Alas, there are 
many signals47 that Cuba is now approaching a limit beyond which its very social and 
human development achievements risk being  fatally undermined, unless its economic 
performance improve  substantially. 










Cuba 0.839 0.863 51 6876 44
China 0.756 0.772 99 5383 10
Vietnam 0.715 0.725 115 2600 13
Chile 0.872 0.878 43 13880 15
Argentina 0.866 49 13238 13
Uruguay 0.865 50 11216 20
Costa Rica 0.844 0.854 53 10842 19
Mexico 0.844 0.854 54 14104 5
Brazil 0.805 0.813 75 9567 4
Colombia 0.785 0.807 82 8587 4
LA and 
Caribbean 0.821 10077
*GDP per capita rank - HDI rank
Source: UNDP 2009
5. Overcoming the infantile disease
Without underestimating the severity of the 2008 terms of trade shock and the 
perpetually  crippling impact of the US embargo, it is fair to acknowledge that  the 
46 Think, for instance, at the positive impact on labor productivity of investments in health, women 
education, and human capital in general.
47 For instance, the temporary migration of so many among the most experienced health workers, while 
decisively benefiting the balance of payments, is also inevitably taking a toll on  the quality of health 
services  supplied to the Cuban population (see above, note 33). 
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present Cuban  crisis is  essentially an endogenous phenomenon. It is just  the most 
recent in a long series of events showing the inadequacy  of  the traditional state 
socialism planning mechanism, which proved unable to  react with sufficient 
promptness and flexibility to relatively minor and physiological changes in the 
international prices of a few key commodities48.  In this context, the stubborn refusal 
to address the contradictions stemming from the artificial level of the CUC official 
exchange rate (let alone the structural distortions produced by currency duality itself) 
is paradigmatic. The very convertibility of the CUC, and ultimately  the 
trustworthiness of the  Cuban State itself  vis-à-vis  foreign partners49 , was sacrificed 
to this totem, dramatically demonstrating the persistence of an old-fashioned penchant 
to address any problem through administrative, rather than price-based policy 
initiatives.
Hopefully, a new lender of last resort will eventually help Cuba to regain a 
workable   short-term equilibrium position without recurring to further painful and 
ultimately inconclusive retrenchment measures in the foreseeable future (see Vidal 
2010a,b). However, in my view, a structural reform of the very state socialism model 
should not be indefinitely postponed.
The guiding theoretical principle  should be  the rational  and realistic 
recognition of the need for any economy - but, a fortiori, for a small, peripheral, and 
underdeveloped socialist economy - to abide by  the “law of value” 50, with respect to 
48 The negative consequences of such a  lack of flexibility are particularly severe in small, peripheral, 
underdeveloped  countries, that are more dependent on  the vagaries of international world markets 
than larger and more powerful countries.
49 Including relatively friendly State partners.
50 The debate on the validity of the "law of value" under socialism is as old long as the history of 
socialism itself (see, among others,  Marx 1894, Stalin 1972, Mao 1977, Guevara 2005, 2006).  In this 
respect, my view is as follows. Notwithstanding their profound differences, both socialism and 
capitalism are modes of production based on the production and exchange of commodities (and 
services).  Thus, in both regimes the relative prices of different types of products must broadly reflect 
the underlying structure of production costs. As only live labor can create value, such a cost structure 
can be seen as correspondent to the  average amount of human labor-time currently required to produce 
different goods and services, under the environmental, technological, and institutional conditions 
prevailing in a given society in a certain period of  time.  The bottom line is that if live and dead labor 
(i.e., workers and machines) are not allocated properly across the socialist economy, and are not 
remunerated according to their contribution to social production, basic economic equilibria are 
violated, and the socialist economy can no longer function.  
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both to domestic and  external equilibria .  Therefore, radical departures from the 
traditional state socialism model are required.  
Almost one century of experience in the former USSR and many other 
socialist countries, including Cuba itself,  have taught a couple of  sobering lessons. 
The first is that the State’s planning capabilities are limited. In order to achieve 
development outcomes superior to those stemming from the spontaneous and anarchic 
interplay of market forces, they should be parsimoniously focused on a pragmatic and 
selective form of strategic planning. The second lesson revolves around the centrality 
of the socialist principle of distribution according to work, which implies  the urgency 
of  abandoning any  unrealisti attempt to implement communist relations of 
production and exchange on the backdrop of a severely underdeveloped productive 
basis. As time passes by, it is more and more urgent for Cuba to rationalize the 
presently over-extended sphere of non-market production and distribution of both 
goods and services. This task cannot be accomplished without a dramatic expansion 
of  the scope and role of markets and of monetary-commercial relations, and therefore 
of relative price and incentive structures. In turn, any meaningful market-oriented 
reform could not possibly work without overcoming the double currency mess and 
restore the meaningfulness of two key prices in particular, namely the foreign 
exchange rate and the real wage. 
With respect to the external equilibrium, in particular, Cuba’s policy-makers 
must definitely come to terms to the fact that the nature of international trade relations 
is  unequal, unstable, and exploitative, dominated as it is by the reproduction needs of 
globalized capitalist relations of production and exchange. Yet, it is also part and 
parcel of an exogenous state of the world that obeys to the laws of evolution and 
decay proper of worldwide modes of production. The potential for bilateral, regional, 
and multilateral agreements, and for other forms of South-South cooperation, is 
relevant, but not to the point of altering dramatically the nature of international trade 
itself - at least, not in a short- to medium-term time framework. Policy-makers in 
small, peripheral, underdeveloped countries, be them socialist- or capitalist-oriented, 
cannot indulge to any nostalgia for a sort of   “fair” prices-based international trade 
utopia. They are price-takers, and can do little to affect the evolution of   international 
relative prices. The best they can do is to apply their limited planning tools on 
development scenarios revolving around the respect of the external equilibrium as the 
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most crucial and binding constraint, attaching utmost priority to urgency to generate 
sufficient foreign exchange through the production of tradable goods and services. 
In sum, in my view, Cuba should urgently overcome the sort of “infantile 
disease” constituted by its outdated state socialism model, and shift to a suitable, 
home-grown version of market socialism.
6. Cuba, China, and Vietnam
Some of the structural market-oriented changes in Cuba will necessarily have 
to resemble those implemented in China and Vietnam.  Among them the most 
relevant are as follows. Market- and price-based regulation shall substitute central 
planning as the main guiding principle of resources allocation. The role of planning 
must correspondently become a less ubiquitous and ambitious one. First, quantity-
based, physical planning tools and targets shall be abandoned as a residual of the past 
(possibly, with a few and localized exceptions). The presently-existing vertical, 
centralized  planning mechanism should evolve into a market-compatible, price-based 
array of policy tools. Macroeconomic control levers are presently inadequate and 
should be upgraded. However, the main focus of   planning should be that of steering 
the overall process of development   as smoothly as possible, in a long-run 
perspective. 
Consistently, the Cuban state should limit its more direct forms of intervention 
in the areas of production to a few strategic sectors51.  These sectors are the only ones 
where the state should retain full or controlling ownership rights.  In this endeavour, it 
should also borrow from the Chinese the wise and commonsensical motto “grasp the 
big, enliven the small”, concentrating its very limited entrepreneurial abilities on a 
reduced number of large and strategic enterprises. Conversely, individual and small-
scale activities in the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors – including agriculture, 
51Here the term “strategic” is utilized in a ad hoc and tautological fashion to refer to those sectors 
where a strong and heavy-handed form of strategic state intervention makes economic sense. A more 
common meaning of “strategic sector” refers to  economic activities  that are of key importance for the 
overall development of the economy as a whole.   
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fishing, manufacturing, trading, tourism, and other traditional services activities52 - 
shall be liberalized and allowed to function autonomously, in an essentially market-
regulated framework dominated by  monetary-commercial relations. Parsimonious 
declarations  on the part of Cuba's leaders in the summer of 2010 do hint to an overall 
liberalization of individual and petty private activities, yet the scope and speed of  this 
potentially significant opening  are not fully clear yet53 (see see Ritter 2010 b, Vidal 
and Pérez Villanueva 2010)
Among all sectors, agriculture54 is the one where the urgency of overhauling 
the presently-existing and hopelessly inefficient relations of production and exchange 
-including, a fortiori, food transport and commercialization services - is most 
pressing.  Rural enterprises should be allowed to re-gain effective operational and 
behavioural autonomy, letting market forces and monetary and commercial relations 
play a central role. The structure of property rights and the very nature of agricultural 
production units shall be radically transformed, in order to promote household-based 
farming, true cooperative associations55, and the massive entrance of FDI. 
Even beyond the boundaries of the primary sector, ideological purity in the 
domain of property relations is neither affordable or useful for a country in such a 
difficult predicament  as present-day Cuba. In my view, in all non-strategic sectors, 
any kind of entrepreneurship should be allowed and promoted by policy-makers, 
including small- and medium-scale capitalist enterprises. However, liberalization 
should not be seen as synonymous of privatization either. On the contrary, the State 
could and probably should retain those SOEs that are actually making profits or can 
reasonably be expected to do so  in the near future, thanks to the results of overall 
structural reforms and of specific, firm-level restructuring  exercises. It should also 
maintain its ownership rights in industrial and services joint ventures, especially in the 
tourism sector.
52 Private initiatives in advanced and especially knowledge-intensive sector should also be welcome. 
Yet they  are to be seen as complementary to a major investment, planning and regulatory drive led by 
the State and involving  a high degree of FDI participation.  
53 Of course, letting spontaneous market regulation play a dominant role  does not imply  a retreat from 
the basic right/duty on the part of the State to provide a legal/ formal regulatory framework also in 
these sectors, as well as to tax the (now) legitimate incomes earned by private agents.
54 Agriculture is surely a strategic sector from the point of view of its crucial role in Cuba’s economy, 
but not one where the State should maintain a high level of direct intervention.
55 Most farms are still formally cooperatives, yet neither  were they born from a genuine cooperative 
effort, nor do they dispose of  sufficient  property and decision rights to be  really autonomous.
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Of course, for prices to start again playing a meaningful and efficiency-
enhancing role, a number of other reforms must be enacted. These reforms are of a 
macroeconomic nature, and shall be enacted as part of a comprehensive and (as much 
as possible) consistent and properly-sequenced  home-grown structural adjustment 
package (see,  Pérez Villanueva  2006,2009, Triana Cordoví , 2008, Vidal 2008a, 2010a,b 
Vidal 2010a,b). The implementation of such a package will be painful and not exempt 
of risks. Yet, the short-run distortions stemming from macroeconomic disequilibria 
are extreme, and the long-run damage to Cuba’s development perspectives is already 
severe. Moreover, the risks implicit in such a drastic adjustment manoeuvre  would 
increase, rather than diminish, if inaction prevailed and bold action were indefinitely 
procrastinated. 
 As mentioned above, two prices in particular are key for macroeconomic and 
external equilibria and must find a proper and realistic level: the exchange rate and the 
wage level. The double currency conundrum, mother of all the contradictions and 
distortions that plague the Cuban economy, must be finally superseded.  Perennial real 
currency overvaluation, along with old-fashioned centralized planning, should also 
become a thing of the past: the unified Cuban currency must be set at a realistic 
exchange rate parity level. 
A wage reform aimed at re-establishing a basic relationship between the 
formal level of wages and the cost of a subsistence basket of goods and services 
should also be implemented. Presently, wages for most workers are so low (even by 
the austere consumption standards to which Cubans are used since the 1990s) that 
people are increasingly forced into engaging in multiple informal activities56. The 
wage reform would constitute a  necessary preliminary step to set up an adequate 
structure of work incentives, in order to re-establish the now-shattered  working 
ethics, and to rein in the crippling process of overall illegalization of subsistence 
activities in which most (especially urban) Cubans are now trapped. 
56 As part of the overall reform package, many of these activities should actually be legalized. 
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7. Cuba’s knowledge-based development prospects
History, geography and path-dependency matter, and the same blueprint 
cannot be applied  mechanically everywhere. In many important domains, the reform 
path for Cuba’s transition to market socialism is bound to differ profoundly from that 
of China and Vietnam. The  international scenario is different from the one   which 
prevailed in the last quarter of the XXth century. The financial and economic malaise 
affecting all the major capitalist countries, the very ascent of China and of the other 
so-called BRICs, and the new correlation of forces in Latin America present both 
challenges and opportunities for Cuba’s international trade and cooperation relations. 
Even more importantly, there are many crucial structural  differences  between 
present-day Cuba, on one hand,  and China and Vietnam in the late 1970s- early 
1980s, on the other hand. The most relevant ones revolve around wages and the 
respective roles of services and manufacturing.
Most Cubans are affected by deep poverty in terms of lack of access to 
virtually any consumption good or service beyond the realm of a very austere 
definition of  subsistence. Yet, Cuba’s  level of human development in 2010 is still 
higher than that of China and Vietnam. A fortiori,  it is incomparably higher than the 
level of human development of the two Asian countries  at the time of the inception of 
market-oriented reforms. Notwithstanding all the inefficiencies and distortions 
plaguing its state socialist model, Cuba’s relatively high level of human development 
is crucially predicated on the sustainability of its public services systems. Due to very 
nature of these services sectors, and to Cuba’s specific comparative advantage built 
after decades of extraordinary needs-focused  policy priorities in the allocation of 
scarce national resources, the cost of delivering rather good health, education, and 
other basic services in Cuba is relatively low.57 Nevertheless, it’s not a free lunch. The 
cost of labor in Cuba must embody the onus of funding basic public services, and 
therefore it is too high to make the island an attractive location to set up labor-
57 Think, for instance, at the enormous difference between overall health costs in the US and in Cuba, 
not matched by the barely identifiable  gap between the two countries in terms of basic health outcomes 
indicators.
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intensive, low-tech manufactures58. The latter observation applies in a similar fashion 
to domestic and foreign investors,   public-owned (controlled) enterprises  and private 
firms.
China and, to a lesser extent, Vietnam, are large countries in terms of 
population size. Even under the state socialist model, before they started 
experimenting with market-oriented reforms, they had already advanced enough in 
the path of self-centered industrialization and economic diversification to be able to 
produce (inefficiently) a vast array of industrial products59. On the contrary, in Cuba, 
owing to the small size of the domestic market and the specific form of economic 
domination on the part of the US, industrialization did not go very far before the 
revolution. Due to the particularly distorted and dependent features of the Cuban 
insertion in the CMEA division of labor, industrialization and diversification in the 
subsequent thirty years were not impressive either. Then, almost two decades of de-
industrialization followed.  At present, in most manufacturing sectors, Cuba’s 
endowment  of both physical and (to a lesser extent) human capital would be  too 
scarce to allow for potential competitiveness in international markets, even in a 
hypothetical scenario of  successful market-oriented reforms along the lines sketched 
above. 
In sum, Cuba lost the train of export-led massive industrialization and now it 
is  too late to try to catch it again. Cuba will never approach the levels  of 
industrialization of  China and Vietnam (see above,  Table 3). 
However, In Cuba there are  two relatively narrow sets of manufacturing 
sectors that do exhibit a significant potential. 
58 Cuba cannot  compete wage-wise  in garments and other very labor-intensive manufacturing sectors 
with some Asian and Central American countries where class and caste-based inequalities,  mass 
malnutrition and illiteracy, and the virtual non-existence of a national public health system contribute 
to a very low level of wages. In most medium-tech manufacturing sectors, Cuba’s potential level of 
productivity would be far below that of major semi-industrialized Asian and Latin American exporters. 
59 The comparison is less straightforward  in terms of infrastructure endowments.  With respect to 
China and Vietnam in the late 1970s- 1980s, Cuba has the advantage of a relatively  well-developed 
network of paved roads, which is presently underutilized.
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The larger set  comprises  various low- and medium-tech  essential sectors that 
are mostly supplied by domestic producers in virtually all semi-industrialized 
countries, among them agro-industry and basic non-tradable manufactures. 
Conversely, these industrial activities  are presently exceptionally under-developed, 
and hence import-dependent, in Cuba. It is reasonable that Cuba, in a medium term 
scenario, might achieve minimum acceptable efficiency and productivity 
improvements sufficient to make it viable a limited  form of import-substituting re-
industrialization process.
The other, smaller  set is constituted by  a few niche manufacturing sub sectors 
characterized by high, specialized human capital intensity, but relatively low physical 
capital intensity. Cuba already successfully produces biotechnology, drugs, and 
medical equipment. 60It can expand and enhance its ability to manufacture and export 
these and other knowledge-intensive goods. To this purpose,  while maintaining and 
selectively strengthening the traditional priority  accorded to these sectors in the 
allocation of public investment, policy-makers should   reform elite  public enterprises 
to endow them with more autonomy and market-orientation61, and promote various 
forms of international cooperation (such as FDI, joint ventures, and 
intergovernmental international agreements). 
Industrial development prospects in selected human capital-intensive niches, 
however, are to be seen  essentially as ancillary and complementary to the 
development of   knowledge-intensive services. Due to the uniqueness of Cuba’s 
economic history, health62 and possibly other knowledge-intensive services (such as, 
for instance, some specialized R&D  and consulting services niches) are in fact  the 
only sectors63 that might hold a true potential for becoming the engine for a 
sustainable and sustained development drive for the Cuban economy  as a whole.64. 
60  In 2009 medicines and pharmaceutical products  export grew strongly in 2009, and their share of 
total goods exports rose to 20% from 9% in 2008 (see ONE 2010).  
61 Elite Cuban service and manufacturing SOEs operating in health-related sub-sectors  already enjoy a 
higher level of autonomy than most other enterprises.
62 Here I refer holistically to the whole health cluster,  which includes a goods-producing component 
manufacturing vaccines, drugs, biotechnology products and  medical equipment,  as well as diverse 
health-related services  such as health tourism and  public health planning consultancies (see Cuba 
Health Tourism 2010).
63 Most of the growth potential in  agriculture and industry  is of an import-substituting nature.
64 As in any other domain, Cuba's insertion in the global services value chain has been severely limited 
so far by the US embargo, which, in particular,  is the main culprit for the island's virtual Internet 
apartheid. This constraint  might become less binding in the future, thanks to the decline of the 
formerly hegemonic power of the US and the emergence of a multi-polar international economic 
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Contrary to non-strategic sectors, the role of the State in the development of 
knowledge-intensive services remains crucial. Cuba’s comparative advantage can 
only be maintained and enhanced if an adequate amount of public resources continues 
to be earmarked to these sectors.
 However,   enterprise autonomy and incentives  should be revamped in these 
advanced services sectors as well.  Where possible, presently-existing monopolistic 
and vertical forms control on specific services value chains should be made more 
flexible, and competition encouraged. New forms of creative entrepreneurship, 
including public-private partnerships65,  should be legalized and supported. FDI and 
other forms of international partnerships should also be promoted.
Yet, these are necessary, but not sufficient conditions. The planning 
mechanism shall be modernized and fine-tuned, utilizing both price- and non price-
based policy tools. The key strategic objective should be to exploit  the  potential 
synergies and economies of scale and scope  that can arise from the joint pursue of 
two different and valuable goals. One is the direct non-market satisfaction of  basic 
needs. The other is the generation of foreign exchange through the production of 
tradable  services. An intrinsic tension between these two goals is inevitable, and the 
risk of over-penalizing basic service functions while transforming health and related 
sectors in a purely money-making machine is a real one. Yet, alternatives are few and 
the challenge is worth taking.
 8. Conclusions
Cuba’s post-revolutionary economic history has been constantly handicapped 
and constrained by the embargo and by a host of other exceptionally aggressive 
measures on the part of the US, the scope of which goes far beyond the domain of 
scenario.
65 A possible example could be offered by China’s successful experience with university-funded R&D 
quasi-autonomous R&D-oriented enterprises (see Gabriele & Khan 2010).
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trade itself66. Yet, it has also been penalized by the twin sets of distortions stemming 
from its former, artificial trade relations with the CMEA and from the very nature of 
the state socialist model. Economic performance has been unstable and lacklustre, 
recurrently plagued by dramatic crises and by recurring and ultimately inconclusive 
de-centralizing and re-centralizing policy trends. Systemic contradictions inherent to 
Cuba’s centralized planning system hit particularly severely the goods-producing 
macro-sector. Both industry and agriculture are very underdeveloped, and as result 
Cuba is plagued by an abysmal degree of food self-sufficiency, and more generally by 
an abnormally high degree of import-dependency in the area of goods.
Conversely, Cuba’s centralized resource allocation system and the consistent 
priority accorded to the satisfaction of basic needs were instrumental in engineering a 
remarkable accumulation of human capital and an extraordinary development of 
public services. The choice of   non-market, needs-based, and universal provision of 
health and education  allowed Cuba to advance in these two crucial areas far more 
than what would have been thinkable under a more conventional policy approach, 
taking into account the poor development of the country’s productive forces. These 
achievements led Cuba to attain a very high level of human development, and 
serendipitously endowed the country with a lingering comparative advantage in some 
advanced, knowledge-based services sectors.
As a result of the divorce between the development of the two macro-sectors, 
Cuba’s economy is presently unique in the developing world. What is particularly 
striking is not the overwhelming dominance of services according to indicators such 
as their relative share in employment and GDP (which are inflated by the 
underdevelopment of the goods-producing macro-sector). Rather, it is  the crucial and 
structural role acquired by knowledge-based services exports in ensuring - however 
precariously - Cuba’s external trade equilibrium.
The tension between Cuba’s exceptional human development achievements 
and the weakness of their material foundation cannot be maintained indefinitely. The 
Cuban government  has recognized this reality, and is beginning to promote some 
radical  changes. It should also acknowledge the intrinsic deficiencies of the central 
planning mechanism, the need for expanding the role of the market and of monetary-
66In spite of Cuba's non-confrontational attitude, demonstrated among other things by the liberation of 
most political prisoners, such aggressive US measures are not likely to be eliminated any time soon.  
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commercial relations, and the cruciality of the law of value and of the socialist 
criterion of distribution according to work.  These principles should be translated  into 
a structural reform program, with the ultimate goal  of  definitely superseding the 
traditional state socialist model,  transitioning   towards a specifically Cuban form of 
market socialism.
Such a new economic model would necessarily resemble that of China and 
Vietnam in many ways (most importantly, with respect to the role of markets, prices, 
and incentives,  and  to the re-orientation of the planning mechanism towards 
selective and strategic goals). Yet, it would also differ profoundly from the experience 
of the two Asian market-socialist countries.  Cuba’s development prospects cannot be 
axed on labor-intensive industrialization, but shall necessarily focus on harnessing its 
potential for boosting export-oriented knowledge-based services sectors and on 
overcoming progressively its present state of inter- sectoral and intra-sectoral lack of-
integration.  This  development perspective would allow   marked efficiency and 
productivity improvements with respect to the present state of things, but would not 
open the way to sustainable spurts of two-digit GDP growth rates.
Other important differences between the new Cuban model and the presently-
existing forms of market socialism in China and Vietnam would refer to the role of 
state ownership, the structure  of (non-tradable) basic services,  and  the depth of 
social inequalities. Even after the transition, Cuba’s market socialism should be 
characterized by a larger relative role of public property than it is the case in China 
and Vietnam, especially in  sectors such as tourism and light manufacturing that in the 
two Asian countries are dominated by private entrepreneurs.  Public non-market 
provision and  delivery of basic services shall also remain the rule in health, education 
and basic services in general. Cuba can and must avoid  the disasters caused in China 
and Vietnam by the ill-fated attempts at privatization and by the wanton application of 
high user fees in areas where such a kind of market-based  approach is totally 
inadequate.  
Partly as a result, once the transition will be successfully completed, the 
degree of social inequalities in Cuba should be lower than in present-day China or 
Vietnam, for three main reasons.  
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First, private property  of means of production in Cuba is bound to remain 
confined mostly to petty, small-and medium-scale activities, more so than in  China or 
Vietnam.   A relatively modest role of private property would be  consistent with a 
low degree of primary income inequalities stemming from non-labor  incomes. 
Second, the preservation of free or quasi-free universal access to basic services 
is and shall continue being an utmost priority.  If   it will be materially possible to 
maintain such a universal access to basic services, the severe social inequalities still 
plaguing China and Vietnam in this domain so crucial for each country’s human 
development67 can be largely avoided. 
Third, once the transition will be successfully completed, it is reasonable to 
expect that the dependency of people’s livelihood strategy on informal transactions 
and activities (which is  probably the most powerful source of de facto inequality in 
present-day Cuba) will be minimized.
In sum, under an optimistic scenario, Cuba might be able to establish  a new 
and specific model of market socialism. This model which, albeit less dynamic in 
terms of GDP growth, could exhibit two distinct social advantages with respect to the 
early Chinese and Vietnamese  experiences. First, non-market universal provision of 
basic social services, rather than being virtually dismantled as it happened during the 
first decades of market socialist experiments in the two Asian countries,  would be 
maintained and further enhanced. Second, the role of indigenous medium- and large-
scale capitalist enterprises in employment, industrial production, and exports, might 
remain relatively minor, thereby minimizing its negative implications in terms of 
income inequalities and class differentiation. 
67 See Gabriele and Schettino 2008a,b.
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